

# URBAN ECONOMICS

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


# Urban Economics

SIXTH EDITION

*Arthur O'Sullivan*

Department of Economics  
Lewis & Clark College



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
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
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# Brief Contents

*Preface* ix

*Acknowledgments* xi

*Chapter 1* Introduction and Axioms of Urban Economics 1

## Part I

MARKET FORCES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF CITIES 15

---

*Chapter 2* Why Do Cities Exist? 17

*Chapter 3* Why Do Firms Cluster? 34

*Chapter 4* City Size 55

*Chapter 5* Urban Growth 72

## Part II

LAND RENT AND LAND-USE PATTERNS 99

---

*Chapter 6* Urban Land Rent 101

*Chapter 7* Land-Use Patterns 130

*Chapter 8* Neighborhood Choice 161

*Chapter 9* Zoning and Growth Controls 185

Part III	
URBAN TRANSPORTATION	205
<hr/>	
Chapter 10 Externalities from Autos	207
Chapter 11 Mass Transit	235
Part IV	
URBAN CRIME	255
<hr/>	
Chapter 12 Crime	257
Part V	
HOUSING	281
<hr/>	
Chapter 13 Why Is Housing Different?	283
Chapter 14 Housing Policy	301
Part VI	
LOCAL GOVERNMENT	321
<hr/>	
Chapter 15 The Role of Local Government	323
Chapter 16 Local Government Revenue	341
Appendix Tools of Microeconomics	367
 Index	 391



# Contents

<i>Preface</i>	ix	
<i>Acknowledgments</i>	xi	
<i>Chapter 1</i>	Introduction and Axioms of Urban Economics	1
<i>What Is Urban Economics?</i>	1	
<i>What Is a City?</i>	2	
<i>Why Do Cities Exist?</i>	3	
<i>The Five Axioms of Urban Economics</i>	6	
1. Prices Adjust to Achieve Locational Equilibrium	7	
2. Self-Reinforcing Effects Generate Extreme Outcomes	9	
3. Externalities Cause Inefficiency	9	
4. Production Is Subject to Economies of Scale	10	
5. Competition Generates Zero Economic Profit	11	
<i>What's Next?</i>	11	
<i>References and Additional Reading</i>	12	
<i>Appendix:</i>	Census Definitions	12
<i>Urban Population</i>	12	
<i>Metropolitan and Micropolitan Statistical Areas</i>	13	
<i>Principal City</i>	14	
	Part I	
	MARKET FORCES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF CITIES	15
<i>Chapter 2</i>	Why Do Cities Exist?	17
<i>A Region Without Cities—Backyard Production</i>	17	

<i>A Trading City</i>	18	
Comparative Advantage and Trade	19	
Scale Economies in Exchange	19	
<i>Trading Cities in Urban History</i>	20	
Trading Cities in World History	20	
Trading Cities in American History	21	
<i>A Factory Town</i>	22	
Determining Wages and Prices	22	
The Market Area of a Factory Town	23	
<i>The Industrial Revolution and Factory Cities</i>	24	
Innovations in Manufacturing	25	
Innovations in Transportation	26	
Innovations in Agriculture	26	
Energy Technology and Location Decisions	26	
<i>A System of Factory Towns</i>	27	
<i>Materials-Oriented Firms and Processing Towns</i>	29	
Scale Economies and Market Areas	29	
System of Processing Towns	30	
Other Examples of Materials-Oriented Industries	30	
<i>Summary</i>	31	
<i>Applying the Concepts</i>	31	
<i>References and Additional reading</i>	32	
 <i>Chapter 3 Why Do Firms Cluster?</i>		34
<i>Sharing Intermediate Inputs</i>	35	
Dresses and Buttons	36	
High-Technology Firms	37	
<i>Sharing a Labor Pool</i>	37	
The Isolated Firm	38	
Locating in a Cluster	39	
Expected Profits Are Higher in the Cluster	39	
<i>Labor Matching</i>	40	
A Model of Labor Matching	40	
Agglomeration Economies: More Workers Implies Better Matches	42	
<i>Knowledge Spillovers</i>	43	
<i>Self-Reinforcing Effects Cause Industry Clusters</i>	43	
The Cost of Clustering	44	



Benefits of Clustering	45
Self-Reinforcing Effects	45
<i>Evidence of Localization Economies</i>	46
<i>Urbanization Economies</i>	47
Sharing, Pooling, and Matching	47
Corporate Headquarters and Functional Specialization	47
Knowledge Spillovers	49
Evidence of Urbanization Economies	49
<i>Other Benefits of Urban Size</i>	49
Joint Labor Supply	50
Learning Opportunities	50
Social Opportunities	51
<i>Summary</i>	51
<i>Applying the Concepts</i>	51
<i>References and Additional Reading</i>	53

## Chapter 4 City Size

55

<i>Utility and City Size</i>	55
Benefits and Costs of Bigger Cities	55
Locational Equilibrium, Land Rent, and Utility within a City	57
<i>A System of Cities</i>	58
Cities Are Not Too Small	58
Cities May Be Too Large	60
<i>Specialized and Diverse Cities</i>	60
A Model of Laboratory Cities	61
Example: The Radio Industry in New York	62
Evidence of Laboratory Cities	63
<i>Differences in City Size</i>	63
Differences in Localization and Urbanization Economies	64
Local Goods and City Size	64
Local Employment Amplifies Size Differences	65
<i>The Size Distribution of Cities</i>	66
The Rank-Size Rule	66
Urban Giants: The Puzzle of Large Primary Cities	68
<i>Summary</i>	69
<i>Applying the Concepts</i>	69
<i>References and Additional Reading</i>	71







<i>Bid-Rent Curves for the Information Sector</i>	104
Travel for Information Exchange	104
Office Bid-Rent Curve with a Fixed Lot Size	106
<i>Office Bid-Rent Curves with Factor Substitution</i>	108
Building Options: The Office Isoquant	108
Factor Substitution: Choosing a Building Height	109
Factor Substitution Generates a Convex Bid-Rent Curve	110
<i>Housing Prices</i>	112
Linear Housing-Price Curve: No Consumer Substitution	112
Consumer Substitution Generates a Convex Housing-Price Curve	114
<i>The Residential Bid-Rent Curve</i>	116
Fixed Factor Proportions	116
Factor Substitution	116
Residential Density	117
<i>Relaxing the Assumptions: Time Costs, Public Services, Taxes, Amenities</i>	118
<i>Land-Use Patterns</i>	119
Bid-Rent Curves for Business	119
Territories of Different Sectors	121
<i>Summary</i>	122
<i>Applying the Concepts</i>	123
<i>References and Additional Reading</i>	124
<i>Appendix: Consumer and Factor Substitution</i>	124
<i>Consumer Choice and the Law of Demand</i>	125
Maximizing Utility: $MRS = \text{Price Ratio}$	126
Consumer Substitution	126
Locational Equilibrium	127
<i>Input Choice and Factor Substitution</i>	127
 <i>Chapter 7 Land-Use Patterns</i>	 130
<i>The Spatial Distribution of Jobs and People</i>	130
The Spatial Distribution of Employment	130
The Distribution of Office Space	134
The Spatial Distribution of Population	135
Commuting Patterns	135
<i>A Closer Look at Subcenters</i>	135
Subcenters in Los Angeles and Chicago	136
Edge Cities	136
Subcenters and City Centers	137



<i>Urban Density</i>	138	
Densities of World Cities	138	
Density Gradients	138	
<i>The Rise of the Monocentric City</i>	139	
Innovations in Intracity Transportation	140	
The Technology of Building Construction	141	
The Primitive Technology of Freight	142	
<i>The Demise of the Monocentric City</i>	142	
Decentralization of Manufacturing: Trucks and Highways	142	
Other Factors: Automobiles, Single-Story Plants, and Airports	143	
Decentralization of Office Employment	143	
Decentralization of Population	144	
<i>Urban Sprawl</i>	145	
Sprawl Facts	145	
The Causes of Sprawl	147	
European Policies	148	
The Consequences of Sprawl	148	
Policy Responses to Sprawl?	150	
<i>Summary</i>	150	
<i>Applying the Concepts</i>	150	
<i>References and Additional Reading</i>	151	
<i>Appendix: The Monocentric Model and Applications</i>		153
<i>The Monocentric Model</i>	153	
<i>Income and Location</i>	155	
Trade-off between Commuting and Housing Costs	155	
Other Explanations	156	
<i>A General Equilibrium Model of a Monocentric City</i>	157	
Interactions between the Land and Labor Markets	157	
The General-Equilibrium Effects of the Streetcar	159	
<i>Applying the Concepts</i>	160	
<i>Chapter 8 Neighborhood Choice</i>		161
<i>Diversity versus Segregation</i>	161	
<i>Sorting for Local Public Goods</i>	162	
Diversity in Demand for Local Public Goods	163	
Problems with Majority Rule and Formation of Municipalities	164	
Variation in Consumption of the Taxed Good	165	



<i>Neighborhood Externalities</i>	166	
<i>Neighborhood Choice</i>	167	
Segregation Equilibrium	167	
Integration as a Stable Equilibrium	169	
Mixed Neighborhoods	170	
Lot Size and Public Policy	172	
Minimum Lot Size Zoning and Segregation	173	
<i>Schools and Neighborhood Choice</i>	173	
Educational Achievement and Attainment across Neighborhoods	173	
The Education Production Function	174	
Education Production and Neighborhood Choice	175	
<i>Crime and Neighborhood Choice</i>	176	
<i>Racial Segregation</i>	177	
Racial Preferences and Neighborhood Choice	177	
Other Reasons for Racial Segregation	178	
<i>Consequences of Segregation</i>	179	
The Spatial Mismatch	179	
Schools and the Poverty Trap	181	
Racial Segregation Increases Poverty	181	
<i>Summary</i>	182	
<i>Applying the Concepts</i>	182	
<i>References and Additional Reading</i>	183	
 <i>Chapter 9 Zoning and Growth Controls</i>		185
<i>Land-Use Zoning</i>	185	
The Early History of Zoning	186	
Zoning as Environmental Policy?	186	
Fiscal Zoning	187	
Minimum Lot Zoning and the Space Externality	188	
Provision of Open Space	189	
<i>The Legal Environment of Zoning</i>	190	
Substantive Due Process	191	
Equal Protection	191	
Just Compensation	192	
<i>A City Without Zoning?</i>	193	
<i>Growth Control: Urban Growth Boundaries</i>	194	
Precise Growth Control: Limiting Land Area and Lot Size	195	
Winners and Losers from Growth Boundaries	196	
Urban Growth Boundary and Density	197	



Portland's Urban Growth Boundary	198
Municipal versus Metropolitan Growth Boundaries	199
Trade-Offs with Growth Boundaries and Open Space	199
<i>Other Growth-Control Policies</i>	200
Limiting Building Permits	200
Development Fees	201
<i>Summary</i>	202
<i>Applying the Concepts</i>	202
<i>References and Additional Reading</i>	204

## Part III URBAN TRANSPORTATION 205

---

<i>Chapter 10 Externalities from Autos</i>	207
<i>Congestion Externalities</i>	209
The Demand for Urban Travel	210
The Private and Social Costs of Travel	211
Equilibrium versus Optimum Traffic Volume	212
<i>The Congestion Tax</i>	213
Benefits and Costs of the Congestion Tax	213
Congestion Taxes and Urban Growth	215
<i>Practicalities of the Congestion Tax</i>	216
Peak versus Off-Peak Travel	216
Estimates of Congestion Taxes	217
Implementing the Congestion Tax	217
Pricing HOT Lanes	218
<i>Alternatives to a Congestion Tax</i>	219
Gasoline Tax	219
Subsidies for Transit	220
Eliminating Parking Subsidies	220
<i>The Road Capacity Decision</i>	221
Interpreting the Spaghetti Cost Curves	221
Widen the Road if Congestion Tax Revenue Exceeds the Cost	222
Capacity Expansion and Latent Demand	223
Who Pays for Roads?	223
<i>Autos and Air Pollution</i>	224
Internalizing the Externality	224
A Gasoline Tax	224
Greenhouse Gases and a Carbon Tax	226



<i>Motor Vehicle Accidents</i>	226
Vehicle Safety Policies: Bikers Beware	226
Pay to Drive Policies	228
Accidents and Congestion	231
<i>Automobiles and Poverty</i>	231
<i>Summary</i>	232
<i>Applying the Concepts</i>	232
<i>References and Additional Reading</i>	233

## Chapter 11 Mass Transit

235

<i>Mass Transit Facts</i>	235
Variation in Ridership across Metropolitan Areas and Income	236
Elasticities of Demand for Transit	238
<i>Choosing a Travel Mode: Commuter Choices</i>	238
An Example of Modal Choice	239
The Role of Density	240
Trade-offs in Transit Service	241
High-Occupancy Vehicle Lanes and Busways	242
<i>Designing a Transit System</i>	243
Cost of the Auto System	243
Cost of the Bus System and BART	244
System Choice	244
Light Rail	245
<i>Subsidies for Public Transit</i>	245
Justification for Transit Subsidies	246
Reasons for Transit Deficits	247
<i>Deregulation: Contracting and Paratransit</i>	248
Contracting for Transit Services	248
Paratransit	249
The British Experience with Deregulation	250
<i>Transit and Land-Use Patterns</i>	250
<i>Mass Transit and Poverty</i>	251
<i>Summary</i>	252
<i>Applying the Concepts</i>	252
<i>References and Additional Reading</i>	253



## Part IV URBAN CRIME 255

---

### *Chapter 12 Crime* 257

<i>Crime Facts</i>	257
The Victims of Crime	258
The Costs of Crime	259
<i>The Rational Criminal</i>	259
The Economics of Double Parking	260
Expected Utility and the Decision to Commit Crime	261
Preventing Crime	263
Morality and Anguish Costs	264
<i>The Equilibrium Quantity of Crime</i>	265
Drawing the Supply Curve	265
The Marginal-Benefit Curve and the Equilibrium Quantity of Crime	266
Increasing the Certainty of Punishment	267
Increasing the Severity of Punishment	268
<i>Legal Opportunities and Education</i>	268
Lawful Opportunities and Crime	268
Education as Crime-Fighting Policy	269
<i>Applications: Big-City Crime and the Crime Drop</i>	270
Why Are Crime Rates Higher in Big Cities?	270
Why Did Crime Rates Decrease in the 1990s?	271
<i>How Much Crime?</i>	273
The Optimal Amount of Crime	273
Crime Substitution and the Principle of Marginal Deterrence	275
<i>The Role of Prisons</i>	276
Incapacitation	277
Rehabilitation	277
<i>Summary</i>	278
<i>Applying the Concepts</i>	278
<i>References and Additional Reading</i>	279

## Part V HOUSING 281

---

### *Chapter 13 Why Is Housing Different?* 283

<i>Heterogeneity and Hedonics</i>	283
-----------------------------------	-----



<i>Durability, Deterioration, and Maintenance</i>	284
Picking the Quality Level	285
Changes in Quality and Retirement	287
Abandonment and Public Policy	288
Durability and Supply Elasticity	289
<i>Moving Costs and Consumer Disequilibrium</i>	290
<i>The Filtering Model of the Housing Market</i>	292
Filtering and the Housing Stepladder	292
Subsidies for New Housing	294
The Effects of Growth Controls	295
Filtering with Rising Income	296
The Price Effects of Growth Controls	296
<i>Summary</i>	298
<i>Applying the Concepts</i>	298
<i>References and Additional Reading</i>	300
 <i>Chapter 14 Housing Policy</i>	 301
<i>Public Housing</i>	301
Public Housing and Recipient Welfare	302
Subsidies for Private Housing	304
Low Income Housing Tax Credit	305
The Market Effects of Subsidized Housing	305
<i>Housing Vouchers</i>	307
Vouchers and Consumer Welfare	307
Market Effects of Vouchers	308
Portable Vouchers: Moving to Opportunity	310
<i>Community Development and Urban Renewal</i>	310
Urban Renewal	310
Recent Community Development Programs	311
Homelessness	312
<i>Which Housing Policy is Best?</i>	313
<i>Subsidies for Mortgage Interest</i>	313
Mortgage Subsidy and Efficiency	314
Mortgage Subsidy and Home Ownership	315
<i>Rent Control and Rent Regulation</i>	316
<i>Summary</i>	318
<i>Applying the Concepts</i>	318
<i>References and Additional Reading</i>	319



## Part VI LOCAL GOVERNMENT 321

### Chapter 15 The Role of Local Government 323

<i>The Role of Local Government</i>	324
<i>Local Public Goods: Equilibrium versus Optimum</i>	325
The Efficient Quantity of Local Public Goods	326
The Median Voter Picks the Equilibrium Quantity	327
Tiebout Model: Voting with Feet	327
Benefit Taxation	328
<i>Natural Monopoly</i>	329
<i>Externalities</i>	331
Public Education Externalities and Vouchers	331
Externalities from Public Safety Programs	332
<i>Federalism and Metropolitan Government</i>	333
<i>A Closer Look at the Median Voter Result</i>	334
A Series of Budget Elections	334
The Median Voter in a Representative Democracy	335
Implications of the Median-Voter Rule	337
Limitations of the Median-Voter Model	338
<i>Summary</i>	338
<i>Applying the Concepts</i>	339
<i>References and Additional Reading</i>	340

### Chapter 16 Local Government Revenue 341

<i>Who Pays the Residential Property Tax?</i>	342
The Land Portion of the Property Tax	344
Structure Portion: A Partial Equilibrium Approach	344
Structure Portion: A General-Equilibrium Approach	346
Changing the Assumptions	349
<i>From Models to Reality</i>	350
What about Rental Property Owners and Homeowners?	350
A Practical Guide for Policy Makers	350
What about the Business Property Tax?	351
<i>The Tiebout Model and the Property Tax</i>	352
<i>Limits on Property Taxes</i>	353



<i>Intergovernmental Grants</i>	355
Lump-Sum Grants	356
Matching Grants	357
Summary: The Stimulative Effects of Grants	358
<i>Applications: Welfare and Education Grants</i>	359
Welfare Reform: Matching Grants to Lump-Sum Grants	359
Intergovernmental Grants for Education	361
<i>Summary</i>	362
<i>Applying the Concepts</i>	363
<i>References and Additional Reading</i>	364
<i>Appendix Tools of Microeconomics</i>	367
<i>Index</i>	391